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assert his privilege to be tried in the county in which the venue would
be piroper if the action had been brought only against him.
In any event the "good faith rule" would not seem to be of much value
to a plaintiff who is forced to prosecute his action against several defend-
ants who, if sued alone, would be entitled to be sued in different counties.
For example, in Kansas, which is the leading "good faith rule" jurisdiction,
there was a verdict and judgment against both the resident and the
hon-resident defendants in a court of general original jurisdiction; yet.the
Kansas Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had not commenced his ac-
tion against the resident and the non-resident defendant in good faith."'
V. CONCLUSION
The Ohio courts favor the right of a defendant to be sued at a place
which is convenient to him even though this policy may lead to a multi-
plicity of suits. In their zeal to curb the unscrupulous plaintiff, these courts
have formulated a rule which penalizes the honest plaintiff where the place
of trial is determined by the residence of one of several defendants, who, if
sued separately would be entitled to be sued in different counties. The
fault of any "good faith rule" lies in its inherent lack of objectivity, and in
the resultant raising of collateral issues. Rules of law should be certain.
A rule which would result in both certainty and fairness to such a plaintiff,
while adequately preserving the rights of a defendant as to the place of trial
is one which would foreclose any objections of a defendant to improper
venue on the basis of further proceedings if the plaintiff presents a prima
facie case against the resident defendant.
JOHN A. SCHWEMLER
Equitable Enforcement of Negative Covenants
In Employment Contracts
The growing complexity of modern business has created an increasing
volume of litigation concerning the use of negative covenants in employ-
ment contracts. As competition becomes keener employers seek methods
of maintaining their competitive positions by such covenants. Although
the reported cases in this field are legion, few concrete principles can be
derived from them, thereby creating a problem for the attorney involved in
such litigation. His research often will only establish the time-honored
proposition, "Each case depends upon its own facts." For every group of
cases he will discover holding one way on a given set of facts he can find
almost as many taking the opposite view. For this is a field of law in
'Schoonover v. Clark, 155 Kan. 835, 130 P.2d 619 (1942).
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which it is frequently impossible to reconcile the position of different
courts.
The typical negative covenant situation occurs where X Co. sells
aluminum siding in the city of Mudflats. They hire Y as their salesman
and agent for the eastern section of the city. When Y is hired he signs
a contract of employment. The contract includes a provision by which Y
agrees not to engage in the same -business for himself, or another in com-
petition with X Co. in this area, for a period of two years. Subsequently
X Co. sends Y to their home office where he is taught how the product is
made, and how to demonstrate and sell it. X Co. provides Y with a list of
prospective customers, and he is launched on the way toward a successful
selling career. After working for six months, Y receives a better offer
from Z Co. and goes to work for them selling a similar product. X Co. now
seeks by injunction to enforce the negative covenant in the contract of
employment. How does X Co. establish a cause of action for injunctive
relief?
One thing which must be remembered is that this action is an equitable
one and much discretion is left in the hands of the trial judge. He is prac-
tically free to decide each case as he sees fit, if he can find an equitable
maxim to support his conclusion. Irreparable injury must be shown by
the plaintiff,1 and a Pennsylvania court has held that contracts in partial
restraint of trade are enforceable in equity if all other equitable require-
ments have been met.'
In very early times contracts in restraint of trade were void.3 Gradually
inroads were made on this theory until its complete abrogation by the cele-
brated English case of Mitchell v. Reynolds.' In this case the defendant
assigned to the plaintiff the lease of a bakehouse and gave bond promising
to pay a penalty if he exercised the baking trade in the parish during the
term of the lease. In a suit on the bond the court gave judgment for the
plaintiff stressing the legality of the enterprise and the reasonableness of the
limits as to time and space. The instant case also made a distinction between
total and partial restraints of trade, holding the latter valid if based on good
consideration, not contrary to public policy, and ancillary to the sale of a
business or dissolution of a partnership. The tendency in England subse-
quently became not to enforce negative covenants in employment contracts
unless the employee is about to reveal confidential information, or interfere
wrongly with the employer's customers and trade connections.'
'Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 204 Minn. 300, 283 N.W. 561 (1939).
'Easton Laundries v. Smith, 26 North 324 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1938).
a5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 1634 (Williston and Thompson ed. 1937). For a
history and general discussion of negative covenants see 28 COL. L REV. 81.
dAitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
'Atwood v. Lamont, 3 K.B. 571 (1920); Bowler v. Lovegrove, I Ch. 642 (1921).
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Negative covenants in restraint of employment are usually treated as
partial restraints of trade. But some courts are reluctant to enforce restraints
on employment and so they distinguish between covenants in partial re-
straint of trade and those in restraint of employment.?
Courts generally distinguish three types of interests when negative cove-
nants in employment contracts are sought to be enforced.7 The three in-
terests are the employer's protection of his business, the employee's right to
earn a living, and the welfare of the public."
Included in the first interest is the principle that an employer has a
legitimate interest in maintaining the success of his business, and anything
which is unfairly done to harm his business should not be allowed.9 What
the courts insist on is fair play in that an employee should not take unfair
advantage of his employer. Conversely, if the primary purpose of the con-
tract is to stifle competition and secure an unfair advantage, the contract is
not enforceable.10
Courts are less hesitant to enforce contracts not to compete when the
sale of a business or the dissolution of a partnership is involved than when
an employee is sought to be prevented from working for a competitor.,
This distinction is logical. When a party sells a business he generally re-
ceives additional payment for the good will of that business. To let him
disregard his promise not to compete would be unjust since the parties are
on equal footing and should abide by their promises.
The second interest we are concerned with is the rights of the employee.
Every person has the right to earn a living. The question arises as to
'whether the law should allow a person to contract away this right? Here the
all-inclusive test of reasonableness is used.12 The law will not allow a per-
son to agree not to seek his livelihood. 3 The law will allow, however, as
consideration for his being hired, a person to contract that he will not take
unfair advantage of his employer by working for him now and against him
later."
We must keep in mind that the employer and the employee are not on
an equal bargaining level.' 5 Employers will often include provisions in the
8Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924).
t Smithereen Co. v. Renfroe, 325 Ill. App. 229, 59 N.E.2d 545 (1945).
Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 208 Ind. 245, 195 N.E. 277 (1935).
9Becker College v. Gross, 281 Mass. 355, 183 N.E. 765 (1933).
"Handel v. Knepper, 269 App. Div. 967, 58 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1945).
"May v. Lee, 28 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
'Laundry Co. v. Derrisseaux, 204 Ark. 843, 165 S.W.2d 598 (1942).
'Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E. 2d 757 (1942).
"White Baking Co. v. Snell, 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 172 (Montgomery Com. Pl.
1930).
"Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377 (1945).
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employees contract which are not necessary for the reasonable protection of
the employer. Courts, therefore, quite often will place the burden upon the
employer to prove that the conditions he seeks to have enforced are neces-
sary and reasonable.'0
The third and most elusive factor is the right of the public. This means
that any restraint upon an individual's freedom to move about must pass the
test of public sanction.17 If the restriction offends the public concept of
what is proper it will not be allowed. When the public is held to be injured,
the reasons usually given are that the public will be deprived of the in-
dividual's skills and labor if the injunction is granted and the employee and
his family may become public charges.' 8 Usually if a proper balance is
struck between the rights of the employer and the rights of the employee,
the rights of the public will not be offended.
An attempt will now be made to give a sampling of the tests that various
courts have applied in granting or refusing to grant injunctions against
competing employees.
Some states have statutes which declare that certain contracts are against
public policy. 0  Typical of these statutes is the Oklahoma statute which
states:
Every contract by which any one is restrained from exercising a law-
ful profession, trade, or business of any kind, otherwise than as provided
by the next two sections, is to that extent void.
The next two sections mentioned in the statute allow one who sells the good
will of a business to be restrained from carrying on a like business in the
same area, and partners upon anticipation of dissolution may agree that
none of them should carry on the business within the area where the part-
nership transacted business. 20
Georgia has a statute which states that contracts in general restraint of
trade are against public policy and cannot be enforced.21 A case arose in
Georgia where defendant, a veteran trainee, after beginning work with the
plaintiff was required to sign a contract in which he covenanted not to en-
"May v. Lee, 28 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). However Dyar Sales and
Machinery Co. v. Bleiler, 106 Vt. 425, 175 Ad. 27 (1934) held that the employee
who resisted enforcement of the covenant had the burden of proving that the con-
tract was contrary to public policy, unnecessary for the employer's protection, and
unnecessarily restrictive of the rights of the employee.
1 Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 208 Ind. 245, 195 N.E. 277 (1935).
"36 AM. JuR. 533.
" 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217 (1941). North Dakota has a statute discussed in Olson
V. Swendiman, 62 N.D. 649, 244 N.W. 870 (1932), and South Dakota has an-
other example of a statute discussed in Prescou v. Bidwell, 18 S.D. 64, 99 N.W.
93 (1904).
" 15 OKLA. STAT. § 217 (1941).
21 GA. CODE § 20-505.
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gage in the same line of business, within a seventy-five mile radius of cer-
tain cities, for a period of one year after his employment was terminated.22
Defendant subsequently resigned and took a job with a competitor. In
his bill to enjoin, plaintiff alleged defendant was soliciting customers with-
in the seventy-five mile radius. The contract was held unenforceable be-
cause it was unreasonable and contrary to public policy. An earlier Georgia
case held that contracts in restraint of trade are valid if reasonable as to time
and place.23
In the North Carolina case of Noe v. McDeVitt,24 plaintiff, a barber sup-
ply company, employed defendant who signed a contract not to operate the
same type of business for five years in North and South Carolina, and further
agreed not to contact any account handling this kind of merchandise. De-
fendant terminated the contract and entered the employment of a com-
petitor in the same area where he began soliciting business from some
of the same people he had contacted while in plaintiff's employment. When
the plaintiff attempted to get an injunction, the defendant raised the de-
fense of unreasonable restraint of trade. It was held that the area of re-
striction was unreasonable, because the plaintiff did not prove an estab-
lished business throughout the area. The court rejected the doctrine of
severability and refused to sustain the contract provisions even as to the
area of plaintiff's operations. 25 Ordinarily that doctrine would have al-
lowed the contract to be enforced within the area in which plaintiff could
prove an established business, or if the area included in the contract was
unreasonable, the contract would be enforced as to a reasonable area.2 6
Where salesmen and solicitors have personal contact with customers,
many courts allow a reasonable injunction.2 7  Thus where an employee
gains knowledge of, and contact with plaintiff's customers, a negative cove-
nant will be enforced. 28
Some courts hold that the permissible scope of covenants between em-
ployer and employee is limited to the protection of trade secrets and the
prevention of direct solicitation of the employer's customers.29 Where the
'Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dewberry, 204 Ga. 794, 51 S.E.2d 669 (1949).
'National Linen Service Corp. v. Clower, 179 Ga. 136, 175 S.E. 460 (1934).2228 N.C. 258, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1948).
45 HARv. L REy. 751.
Where the contract is too broad as to area, some courts will apply the doctrine
of severability and enforce it as to the reasonable area. McAnally v. Person, 57
S.W. 2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). However, if the area is too broad and there
is no basis for dividing the territory, the injunction may be denied. Wisconsin Ice
and Coal Co. v. Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819 (1933).
'French Bros. Bauer Co. v. Townshend Bros. Milk Co., 21 Ohio App. 177, 152
N.E. 675 (1925).
'Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 118 Fla. 137, 160 So. 32 (1935).
' Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923); Clark
Paper and Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 140 N.E. 708 (1923).
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employee is trained in only one occupation, the injunction may be denied
on the basis of undue hardship. 0 Inequality of bargaining power is often
used by courts as a reason for denying injunctive relief.31 When an em-
ployer has defaulted in some way, as when he breaches his contract in re-
gard to the payment of wages, he cannot enforce the contract
32
It has been said that there is no reason why public policy should forbid
an employer from protecting himself and his business by contracting with
his employees.33 Two reasons are the most frequently used to support this
tenet. The first is that where the employee has acquired an intimate knowl-
edge of the employer's methods and customers, irreparable injury is caused
when this knowledge is wrongfully used.34 The second is that an employee
may be restricted in his future employment only when the restrictions are
!easonable and necessary to protect the employer. 35 Much confusion results
when these makeshift reasons are used. They can be twisted to sustain any
conclusion the court desires.
The better rule seems to be that the court should consider the contract in
relation to the nature of the business, the intention of the parties, and the
circumstances under which the contract was made. The restraint on the
other hand must be for a just and honest purpose, for the protection of
legitimate interests, reasonable as to the parties, and not adverse to public
interest.3"
Thus, in spite of the general language in the cases, to state a cause of
action in the employment contract area the plaintiff must establish three
things. First, the employer must be free from fault. It seems, however, that
the employer need not plead freedom from violation of the employment
contract, as this is properly a matter of defense.37 Secondly, the relief sought
must be completely necessary, and must not include unreasonable restric-
tions upon the employee. 88 Third, and most important, the employer must
show that he has been injured by the breach of the employment contract
*Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944).
'
1 Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377 (1945).
'langdon v. Progress Laundry and Cleaning Co., 105 S.W. 2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937). In Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 290 Mass. 549, 195 N.E.
747 (1935) injunction was denied where the employee was discharged without
cause.
'Becker College v. Gross, 281 Mass. 355, 183 N.E. 765 (1933).
"'Dyar Sales Math. Co. v. Bleiler, 106 Vt. 425, 175 Ad. 27 (1934).
'Super Maid Cook-Ware Corp. v. Hamil, 50 F. 2d 830 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. de-
njed, 284 U.S. 677, 52 Sup. Ct. 138 (1931).
' Scott v. Hall, 56 Ga. App. 467, 192 S.E. 920 (1937).
'Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 290 Mass. 549, 195 N.E. 747
(1935).
" Wisconsin Ice and Coal Co. v. Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819 (1933).
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and that he will continue to be irreparably injured unless he is given equita-
ble relief."5 There is some dispute as to the kind of injury which will suf-
fice, but it should be an injury that causes the employer loss of customers,
or business, or both.40 This injury must be proved by facts, and will not be
presumed because the employer has the burden of establishing his right to
relief.41
The type of situation in which sufficient injury occurs in most instances
is where the employee has gained personal contact with the customers of the
employer, and subsequently solicits the same customers while competing
with the former employer.42  The next most numerous class of cases is
where the employee has gained knowledge of trade secrets and other con-
fidential information, and is now using that knowledge in competition with
his former employer.43
There are several defenses available to the employee. The most com-
mon defenses are the initial breach of the employment contract by the em-
ployer,44 unnecessary restrictions in the employment contract,45 undue hard-
ship,4" and lack of irreparable harm to the plaintiff.4
CONCLUSION
Courts will enforce a negative employment contract when its restrictions
are reasonably limited in time and space, necessary for the protection of the
employer, not unreasonable to the employee, and when they do not con-
travene public policy. This question depends on the nature and extent
of the business, the nature of the services rendered, and the intentions of the
parties.
The difficulty arises in applying these general and rather vague state-
ments to specific fact situations. The law is in need of simplification and
clarification in the employment contract area. In order to avoid confusion
the courts should state what must be proved in terms which are more clear
so that the trial lawyer will know what he need prove to establish his case.
HARRY STEIN
May v. Lee, 28 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
"Capital Laundry Co. v. Vannozzi, 115 N.J. Eq. 26, 169 At. 554 (1933).
41 May v. Lee, 28 S.W. 2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
'
2 White Baking Co. v. Snell, 28 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 172 (Montgomery Com. Pleas
1930).
"Clark Paper and Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 140 N.E. 708 (1923).
"Langdon v. Progress Laundry & Cleaning Co., 105 S.W. 2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
'Wisconsin Ice and Coal Co. v. Lueth, 213 Wis. 42, 250 N.W. 819 (1933).
" Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944).
'
TCapital Laundry Co. v. Vannozzi, 115 N.J. Eq. 26, 169 Adt. 554 (1933).
